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abstract
This paper studies how the variation in sectoral productivities shapes the sectoral 
composition of the Spanish economy from 1980 to 2015. I first document an asymmetric 
behavior of sectoral productivities: the productivity of services declines over time, whereas 
the productivity of manufacturing increases until the 1990s, before slowing down. I feed the 
path of sectoral productivities observed in the data into a model of structural transformation 
with two sectors (services and manufacturing) which are connected by an Input-Output 
matrix. The model reproduces the variation of the gross output services share of the 
Spanish economy between 1980 and 2015. The model implies that – even absent changes 
in the trends of sectoral productivities – the annual growth rate of GDP between 2015 and 
2050 shrinks by 0.6 percentage points with respect to the average growth rate between 
1980 and 2015. Hence, annual GDP growth would decline from 2.3% to 1.7%. If sectoral 
productivities were to equal the levels observed in the Euro Area between 1980 and 2015, 
the average growth rate of Spanish GDP between 2015 and 2050 would be 2.1%.
Keywords: sectoral analysis, Input-Output matrix, Spanish economy.
JEL classification: O11, O14, O4.
Resumen
Este artículo estudia la variación de la composición sectorial de la economía española 
desde 1980 hasta 2015 desarrollando un modelo de equilibrio general de transformación 
estructural con dos sectores: servicios y manufacturas. Utilizando las sendas de 
productividad sectoriales observadas en los datos como shocks exógenos, el modelo 
reproduce la variación de la cuota de los servicios en el producto bruto total de la economía 
española entre 1980 y 2015. Incluso en ausencia de cambios en las tendencias de las 
productividades sectoriales, en el modelo la tasa de crecimiento anual del PIB entre 2015 y 
2050 se reduce en 0,6 puntos porcentuales con respecto a la tasa de crecimiento promedio 
hasta 2015. Por lo tanto, el crecimiento anual del PIB disminuiría de 2,3 % a 1,7 %. Si las 
productividades sectoriales fueran iguales a los niveles de la zona del euro, la tasa media 
de crecimiento del PIB español entre 2015 y 2050 sería del 2,1 %.
palabras clave: análisis sectorial, matriz de Input-Output, economía española.
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1 Introduction
Over time advanced economies experience a process of structural transformation,
in which the sectoral composition of economic activity shifts from the manufac-
turing sector into services (Kongsamut et al., 2001; Duarte and Restuccia, 2010;
Herrendorf et al., 2013). The Spanish economy is no exception. The relative
importance of services has been rising steadily over time, starting to peaking up
relatively later – but a faster rate – than in the United States and other Euro-
pean countries. For instance, the share of services in employment grew from a
value of 35% in 1960 to a value above 70% in 2015 (Gonzalez-Diez and Moral-
Benito, 2019). This paper revisits the variation in the sectoral composition of the
Spanish economy and the rise of the services sector and makes four main novel
contributions.
First, I study the change in the relevance of manufacturing and services in-
dustries by measuring the contribution of each sector in the aggregate levels of
Spanish gross output. I show that the share of services in gross output increased
from a value of 48% in 1980 to 66% in 2015. Part of this variation was driven
by a rise in the relevance of services industries within the Input-Output ma-
trix of the Spanish economy. Indeed, the services share of intermediate inputs
used by services industries increased from 57% in 1980 to 80% in 2005, whereas
the services share of intermediate inputs used by manufacturing industries in-
creased from 16% in 1980 to 30% in 2005. This evidence points out that also
the network structure connecting the different industries of the economy under-
goes radical changes in its sectoral composition, a phenomenon that Galesi and
Rachedi (2019) refer to as services deepening.
Second, I look at the dynamics of aggregate and sectoral productivities be-
tween 1980 and 2015. I uncover a set of novel facts: (i) aggregate value added
productivity was increasing in the 1980s at an annual growth rate similar to the
2
one observed in the United States, before experiencing a stagnant period of no
growth during the 1990s. From then on, aggregate productivity started declining
at a steady rate. Overall, the level of aggregate productivity in 2015 equals the
level in 1980, implying that on average productivity did not grow throughout
these thirty-five years. Then, (ii) the dynamics of aggregate productivity masks
vast heterogeneity in sectoral productivities. On the one hand, manufacturing
productivity grew at an average annual rate of 0.6% between 1980 and 2015. This
increase is mainly concentrated between 1980 and 1995, in which the growth rate
reached a peak average rate of 2.3%. From 1995 on, manufacturing productivity
has been stagnant until the early 2000, and then dropped down over the last
decade. On the other hand, services productivity was fairly constant during the
1980s, and from then on has been decreasing at a stable pace. Overall, services
productivity shrunk by annual growth rate of -0.3% between 1980 and 2015. Fi-
nally, (iii) consistently with the evidence of Duernecker et al. (2019) and Duarte
and Restuccia (2020), I highlight substantial heterogeneity in the dynamics of
productivity even when looking at the distinct industries within the services sec-
tor. For instance, the productivity of information services increased by an annual
growth rate of 0.8% between 1980 and 2015, whereas the productivities of ac-
commodation and food services and professional services dropped by -2.1% and
-3.2%, respectively.
Third, I build a model of structural transformation and services deepening and
calibrate it to the variation in the sectoral composition of the Spanish economy
between 1980 and 2015. The model consists of a static version of the environment
of Galesi and Rachedi (2019): the economy has two sectors – services and man-
ufacturing – connected by an Input-Output matrix. Accordingly, the final gross
output of each sector can either be consumed or used as an intermediate inputs
in the production of each industry. Each sector derives gross output by combin-
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between 1980 and 2015. The model consists of a static version of the environment
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ufacturing – connected by an Input-Output matrix. Accordingly, the final gross
output of each sector can either be consumed or used as an intermediate inputs
in the production of each industry. Each sector derives gross output by combin-
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ing labor and intermediate inputs with a Cobb-Douglas technology. The gross
output of each sector depends also on the level of sector-specific productivities,
that grow over time at different exogenous rates. The model features a represen-
tative household which derives utility from aggregate consumption. Importantly,
the functions that bundle together either the consumption of both sectors into
an aggregate consumption good or the intermediate inputs of both sector into a
final intermediate good are CES aggregators with a non-unitary elasticity of sub-
stitution across sectors. In this setup, the variation of the sectoral composition
of the economy comes from a Baumol (1967) disease mechanism similar to the
one emphasized by Ngai and Pissarides (2007), which builds on two ingredients:
as long as (i) manufacturing productivity increases more rapidly than the pro-
ductivity of services, and (ii) the elasticity of substitution of consumption and
intermediate inputs is below one, then the share of services rises over time.
Then, I calibrate the model to the Spanish economy. Namely, I feed the model
with the paths of sectoral productivities observed in the data between 1980 and
2015, choose an elasticity of substitution of consumption and intermediate inputs
very close to zero (Herrendorf et al., 2013), and set the parameters such that the
model can replicate the services share of gross output of 1980. This calibration
strategy manages to deliver a model-implied path for the services share of gross
output between 1980 and 2015 which tracks remarkably well the dynamics of
the share observed in the data. Hence, the model is an ideal laboratory to
look at the causes and implications of structural transformation for the Spanish
economy. Importantly, I find a relevant role for services deepening in accounting
for the time variation of the services share of gross output. Indeed, when I
abstract from the changes in the sectoral composition of intermediate inputs and
consider an Input-Output matrix which is kept constant with the sectoral split
of 1980, then the model explains just 60% of the rise of services in gross output.
4
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This finding confirms the results of Galesi and Rachedi (2019), that emphasize
that the presence of services deepening via the variation in the services share of
intermediate inputs can improve the fit of structural transformation models
Fourth, I use the model to look at the implications of structural transformation
on the dynamics of the Spanish economy going forward, from 2015 to 2050. More
precisely, I assume that from 2015 to 2050 the Spanish economy will experience
the same path of sectoral productivities observed in the data from 1980 to 2015,
and compare the implied average annual growth rate of GDP over 1980-2015
and 2015-2050. This approach allows me to isolate the role of rising services
in the determination of aggregate productivity over the two periods of interest,
while avoiding to impose any additional stance of the future trends of sectoral
productivity. In this way, I can ask how much the average growth rate of GDP
will change going forward due to the reallocation towards services even in the
case there is no variation in the underlying path of sectoral productivities.
The model implies that the rise of services – which is the sector with relatively
lower (and even negative) productivity growth – will dampen substantially GDP
growth: the average annual GDP growth from 2015 to 2050 will be 0.6 percentage
points lower than the average annual GDP growth from 1980 to 2015. Since real
GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.3% over the last thirty-five years, the model
implies that over the next three decades annual GDP will grow at a rate of
1.7%. Finally, I consider a counterfactual case in which the path of sectoral
productivities from 2015 to 2050 follows the path observed in the data in Euro
area countries from 1980 to 2015. In this alternative scenario the economy keeps
experiencing a rise of the services sector, but with a level of sectoral productivities
which is higher than the one observed in the Spanish economy. In this alternative
exercise, the model implies that the drop in GDP growth going forward would
be very limited, as the average growth rate from 2015 to 2050 would equal 2.1%.
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Hence, if the sectoral productivities of the Spanish economy manages to increase
over time, the process of structural transformation would have a much smaller
dampening effect of the future path of GDP growth.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section reports the empirical evidence on both the changes in the sectoral
composition of the Spanish economy and the rise of services, and the trends in
aggregate and sectoral productivities.
I start by showing the variation in the services share of the Spanish economy
over time. I look at the services share of five different variables: gross output,
value added, employment, services intermediate inputs, and manufacturing in-
termediate inputs. I assume that the whole economy equals the sum of services
and manufacturing industries, so that my empirical evidence connects explicitly
to the model-based moments describing the process of structural transformation
from manufacturing to services. All the moments are derived by using informa-
tion of the World KLEMS project (Jorgenson, 2007). For each variable I report
the services share in 1980, 2005, and 2015. I consider the year 2005 as it is the
last period of time in which the World KLEMS data give information on the
sectoral composition of intermediate inputs.
Table 1 reports the services shares of the Spanish economy in 1980, 2005,
and 2015. The table shows that the services share of the economy has been
rising substantially from the 1980s, generating for instance a 38.4% increase in
the services share of gross output between 1980 and 2015. A similar change also
characterizes the services share of employment. Instead, the rise of services when
looking at the sectoral composition of value added is much more muted, as the
overall change is 23.9%. The lower increase of the services share of value added
6
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2003
Hence, if the sectoral productivities of the Spanish economy manages to increase
over time, the process of structural transformation would have a much smaller
dampening effect of the future path of GDP growth.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section reports the empirical evidence on both the changes in the sectoral
composition of the Spanish economy and the rise of services, and the trends in
aggregate and sectoral productivities.
I start by showing the variation in the services share of the Spanish economy
over time. I look at the services share of five different variables: gross output,
value added, employment, services intermediate inputs, and manufacturing in-
termediate inputs. I assume that the whole economy equals the sum of services
and manufacturing industries, so that my empirical evidence connects explicitly
to the model-based moments describing the process of structural transformation
from manufacturing to services. All the moments are derived by using informa-
tion of the World KLEMS project (Jorgenson, 2007). For each variable I report
the services share in 1980, 2005, and 2015. I consider the year 2005 as it is the
last period of time in which the World KLEMS data give information on the
sectoral composition of intermediate inputs.
Table 1 reports the services shares of the Spanish economy in 1980, 2005,
and 2015. The table shows that the services share of the economy has been
rising substantially from the 1980s, generating for instance a 38.4% increase in
the services share of gross output between 1980 and 2015. A similar change also
characterizes the services share of employment. Instead, the rise of services when
looking at the sectoral composition of value added is much more muted, as the
overall change is 23.9%. The lower increase of the services share of value added
6
relative to the variation in the services share of gross output is due to the fact
that gross output equals the sum of value added and intermediate inputs, and the
sectoral composition of intermediate inputs has been also changing dramatically
over the recent decades. The services share of intermediate inputs used by the
services sector has increased by 21.9% between 1980 and 2005, whereas the anal-
ogous share computed over the intermediate inputs used by the manufacturing
sector has almost doubled over the same period of interest. Hence, the shifts in
the sectoral composition of the Input-Output matrix of the economy add to the
variation in the services share of value added to then generate an even larger
change in the rise of services at the gross output level.
Table 1: The Change in the Sectoral Composition of the Spanish Economy
1980 2005 2015 ∆% ∆%
1980-2005 1980-2015
Services Share of 47.8% 66.2% 67.6% +38.4% +41.2%
Gross Output
Services Share of 65.6% 81.3% 83.8% +23.9% +27.8%
Value Added
Services Share of 61.0% 78.7% 84.1% +37.9% +36.2%
Employment
Services Share of 57.0% 69.5% - +21.9% -
Services Intermediate Inputs
Services Share of 15.6% 30.0% - +92.4% -
Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs
Note: This table reports the variation in the sectoral composition of the Spanish economy in 1980,
2005, and 2015. In particular, it shows the services share of gross output, value added, employment, the
intermediate inputs used by the services sector, and the intermediate inputs used by the manufacturing
sector. Source: World KLEMS Data.
Importantly, as shown by Gonzalez-Diez and Moral-Benito (2019) and Galesi
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and Rachedi (2019), th se trends are roughly in line with the experien e of other
advanced economies, with the only difference that Spain has been experiencing
the process of servicization relatively later, to then catch up at a faster rate.
Then, I turn into the analysis of the dynamics of value added productivity
between 1980 and 2015, and again I use information from the World KLEMS
Data. I start by looking at the aggregate productivity, and compare the experi-
ence of the Spanish economy with that of a selected group of advanced economies:
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United States. Figure 1 reports the
dynamics of aggregate productivity for each of these countries between 1980 and
2015, by normalizing the first observation to one.
Figure 1: Value Added Productivity
Note: This figure shows the level of value added productivity for a group of selected
countries (i.e., France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United States)
between 1980 and 2015. The productivities are normalized to be 1 in 1980. Source:
World KLEMS Data.
Figure 1 shows that the country with the highest growth rate of aggregate
productivity between 1980 and 2015 is Germany, with an average annual rate
of 1%, and a dramatic acceleration amidst the reunification. After Germany,
8
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Figure 1 shows that the country with the highest growth rate of aggregate
productivity between 1980 and 2015 is Germany, with an average annual rate
of 1%, and a dramatic acceleration amidst the reunification. After Germany,
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the country with the highest growth is the United States, which experienced an
average annual growth rate of 0.8%. The productivity of France has been growing
at a rate very similar to the one of the United States until the early 2000s,
before experiencing a decade of stagnant growth: the level of the productivity
in 2015 equals that of 1999. As a result, the average annual growth rate for the
productivity of France is 0.5%. On the other hand, both Italy and Portugal are
characterized by a declining productivity: the 2015 level of productivity in Italy
is 12% lower than the level observed in 1980, whereas the cumulative drop for
the case of Portugal equals 6%. These patterns imply an average annual growth
rate of productivity of -0.4% for Italy and -0.2% for Portugal.
The Spanish experience lies in the middle between the trends of the United
States and France on the on hand, and those of Italy and Portugal on the other
hand. The productivity of Spanish value added grew at a pace remarkably similar
to that of the United States and France between 1980 and 1995: over these years
the average annual growth rate was above 1%. Then, from the 1995, productivity
started to slowing down, to then reach in 2015 the same level it had back in
1980. This result implies that the improvements in Spanish productivity between
1980 and 1995 have been lost over the following two decades. This evidence is
consistent with that of Gopinath et al. (2017) and Garcia-Santana et al. (2020),
that pointed out how rising misallocation of resources has been driving down the
level of productivity of the Spanish economy.
Then, I show that the dynamics of aggregate productivity of the Spanish econ-
omy mask a vast heterogeneity in the sectoral trends of value added TFP. Figure
2 reports the productivities of aggregate value added, services value added, and
manufacturing value added, together with a measure of aggregate value added
productivity that considers total output as just the sum of services and manufac-
turing. The first observation is that as manufacturing and services account for a
9
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very large share of total value added, the trend of aggregate productivity coin-
cides with that of the alternative aggregate series which is just based on services
and manufacturing. This evidence corroborates the fact that the focus of this
paper on just two sectors – services and manufacturing – is able to capture most
of the variation in aggregate productivity. The second observation is that man-
ufacturing productivity has been experiencing a dramatic growth until the mid
1990s: the average annual growth rate of manufacturing productivity between
1980 and 1995 is 2.5%. From then on, it went through a decade of no growth,
before going down from the late 2000s on. Overall, the annual growth rate of
manufacturing productivity between 1980 and 2015 is 0.6%. On the other hand,
services productivity has been rather stagnant until the 1990, before decreasing
at a constant rate: the annual growth rate of services productivity between 1980
and 2015 is -0.3%.
Figure 2: Value Added Productivity Across Sectors
Note: This figure shows the level of value added productivity for a group of selected
countries (i.e., France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United States) between 1980
and 2015. The productivities are normalized to be 1 in 1980. Source: World KLEMS
Data.
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What drives the poor performance of the productivity of services value added?
I address this question by looking at the dynam cs of productivi y of the industries
within the services sector, to highlight that the broad classification of services is
actually bundling all together industries with very different fortunes over time,
in line with the evidence of Duernecker et al. (2019) and Duarte and Restuc-
cia (2020). In particular, I look at eleven industries within the boundaries of
the services sector: wholesale and retail trade, transportation services, accom-
modation and food services, information services, financial services, real estate
services, professional services, the government and public services, education ser-
vices, health care services, and other services. Then, I look at the value added
productivity for each of this sector between 1980 and 2015, again by normalizing
the first observation to one, and report all the series in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Value Added Productivity of Services Industries
Note: This figure shows the change in productivity at the sectoral level for different ser-
vice industries (i.e., wholesale and retail trade, transportation services, accommodation
and food services, information services, financial services, real estate services, profes-
sional services, government and public services, education services, health services, and
other services) of the Spanish economy between 1980 and 2015. The productivities are
normalized to be 1 in 1980. Source: World KLEMS Data.
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Figure 3 shows that there is a vast heterogeneity in the growth rates of value
added productivity within the services sector. For instance, the annual growth
rate of the productivity of professional services is -3.2%. Similar highly negative
growth rates characterize also the accommodation and food services, which have
an annual rate for their productivity that equals -2.1%. On the other hand, there
are few services industries with booming productivity, such as information ser-
vices, whose value added TFP has been increasing at an average annual rate of
0.8%.
Figure 4: Services Productivity Gap with Germany and the United States
Note: This figure shows the wedge of the change in productivity at the sectoral
level for different services industries (i.e., wholesale and retail trade, transportation
services, accommodation and food services, information services, financial services,
real estate services, professional services, government and public services, education
services, health services, and other services) of the Spanish economy between 1980
and 2015 and the change in productivity observed for the same set of industries and
over the same period of time in Germany and the United States. Source: World
KLEMS Data.
I then compute the average annual growth rate for the productivity of each
of these industries, and compare it to the analogous moments for the same set
of industries of Germany and the United States. In this way, I derive a measure
12
of the productivity gap, that is, the difference between the growth rate of a
given industry in Spain relative to the growth rate of the same industry in either
Germany or the United States. A positive number suggests that a given industry
grows faster in Spain than elsewhere, whereas a negative number suggests that
the improvements in the productivity of that industry in Spain are lower than in
foreign economies. Figure 4 reports the results of this exercise. A positive – yet
limited – gap emerges only for the financial, real estate, and education services
(and also heath care services when comparing it to the United States).1
Overall, the findings of Figure 4 and Figure 2 taken together hint to the
fact that the negative growth rate of industries such as accommodation and
food services and professional services may be behind the poor performance of
productivity of the services sector in Spain, especially when comparing it to other
economies.
3 Model
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived risk-neutral2 representative house-
hold which supplies inelastically labor Nt and has preferences over consumption





1The productivity gap of the public sector vis-a´-vis Germany could be driven by different accounting
standards used to compute the number of federal public employees. For an analysis of the components of the
public sector gross output and value added – and their changes over time – see Moro and Rachedi (2018).
2Since the quantitative analysis is derived on a sequence of steady-state, the risk aversion of the house-
hold does not alter the results of the paper. For studies on the business cycle implications of structural
transformation models, see Moro (2012, 2015), Galesi and Rachedi (2019), and Rubini and Moro (2019), and
also Moro and Valdes (2019) for a review of the literature.
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of the productivity gap, that is, the difference between the growth rate of a
given industry in Spain relative to the growth rate of the same industry in either
Germany or the United States. A positive number suggests that a given industry
grows faster in Spain than elsewhere, whereas a negative number suggests that
the improvements in the productivity of that industry in Spain are lower than in
foreign economies. Figure 4 reports the results of this exercise. A positive – yet
limited – gap emerges only for the financial, real estate, and education services
(and also heath care services when comparing it to the United States).1
Overall, the findings of Figure 4 and Figure 2 taken together hint to the
fact that the negative growth rate of industries such as accommodation and
food services and professional services may be behind the poor performance of
productivity of the services sector in Spain, especially when comparing it to other
economies.
3 Model
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hold does not alter the results of the paper. For studies on the business cycle implications of structural
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in which Cs,t is services consumption goods, Cm,t is manufacturing consumption
goods, ωC denotes the share of services in the CES aggregator, and νC is the
elasticity of substitution between services and manufactured consumption goods.
Accordingly, the budget constraint of the representative household reads
Ps,tCs,t + Pm,tCm,t = Nt (3)
in which Ps,t amd Pm,t denote the price of services and manufacturing, respec-
tively, whereas I set the wage to unity as it is the numeraire of the economy. The












Hence, in the empirically relevant case in which the elasticity of substitution
is below one (Herrendorf et al., 2013), then an increase in the price of services
relative to the price of manufacturing reduces the consumption of manufacturing
goods, thus raising the services share of consumption.
Then, the production side of the model features two sectors – services and
manufacturing – each one consisting of a representative firm assembling final
output using labor and intermediate inputs, and a firm transforming services
and manufacturing goods into intermediate inputs. The representative services
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hold do s not alter the results of the paper. For studies on the business cycle implications of structural
transformation models, see Moro (2012, 2015), Gale i and Rac edi (2019), and Rubini nd Mor (2019), and
also M ro and Valdes (2019) for a review of the literature.
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Accordingly, the budget constraint of the representative household reads
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in which Ps,t amd Pm,t denote the price of services and manufacturing, respec-
tively, whereas I set the wage to unity as it is the numeraire of the economy. The












Hence, in the empirically relevant case in which the elasticity of substitution
is below one (Herrendorf et al., 2013), then an increase in the price of services
relative to the price of manufacturing reduces the consumption of manufacturing
goods, thus raising the services share of consumption.
Then, the production side of the model features two sectors – services and
manufacturing – each one consisting of a representative firm assembling final
output using labor and intermediate inputs, and a firm transforming services
and manufacturing goods into intermediate inputs. The representative services
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in which Am,t denotes manufacturing productivity, Nm,t is manufacturing em-
ployment, Hm,t is manufacturing intermediate inputs, and αM denotes the share
of labor in manufacturing gross output. Importantly, I let the share of labor to
differ across sectors to capture the fact that in the data the services sector is as
twice as intensive in labor than manufacturing. The firm chooses employment
and intermediate inputs to maximize profits
max
Nm,t,Hm,t
Pm,tYm,t −Nm,t − PH,m,tHm,t (15)
where PH,m,t is the price of intermediate inputs used in the services sector. The
standard first-order condition for labor equals
Nm,t = αMPm,tYm,t (16)
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In this setup, Equations (11), (12), (20), and (21) characterize the Input-
Output of the economy. The optimal conditions define a mechanism analogous
to that of the first-order condition of consumption, in which an increase in the
relative price of services raises the share of services within the Input-Output
matrix, as long as the elasticities of substitution of intermediate inputs across
sectors νS amd νM are below one.
The resource constraint at the sectoral level implies that the gross output is
split into consumption goods or intermediate inputs used by either industry, that
is
Ys,t = Cs,t + Ss,t + Sm,t, (23)
and
Ym,t = Cm,t +Ms,t +Mm,t. (24)
Finally, the labor market clearing posits that the labor endowment of the house-
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where Sm,t denotes the intermediate inputs produced by the services sector and
then used by manufacturing , while Mm,t is the intermediate inputs both pro-
duced and used by the manufacturing sector. The parameter ωM denotes the
share of services in the CES aggregator, whereas νM is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between services and manufactured intermediate inputs. The maximization
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In this setup, Equations (11), (12), (20), and (21) characterize the Input-
Output of the econo y. The optimal conditions define a mechanism analogous
to that of the first-order condition of consumption, in which an increase in the
relative price of services raises the share of services within the Input-Output
matrix, as long as the elasticities of substitution of intermediate inputs across
sectors νS amd νM are below one.
The resource constraint at the sectoral level implies that the gross output is
split into consumption goods or intermediate inputs used by either industry, that
is
Ys,t = Cs,t + Ss,t + S ,t, (23)
and
Ym,t = Cm Ms,t +Mm,t. 4
Finally, the labor market clearing posits that the labor endowment of the house-
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hold equals the sum of the sectoral employment
Nt = Ns,t +Nm,t, (25)
under the implicit assumption that labor is perfectly mobile across sectors.
3.1 The Rise of Services: An Analytical Characterization
I uncover the mechanisms behind the endogenous variation in the services share
of the economy in the model, by deriving analytically the relationship between
the changes in the sectoral productivities and the sectoral composition of both
value added and intermediate inputs.
First, I characterize the process of structural transformation, and isolate it
by looking at the variation in the services share of value added. Under the
assumptions that the production of the final good only requires labor, so that
αS = αM = 1, then sectoral prices equal the inverse of sectoral productivities,
that is, Ps,t = 1/As,t and Pm,t = 1/Am,t, and the relative price of services in terms
of manufacturing goods equals the ratio between manufacturing and services




. Thus, the relative price of services increases
when the manufacturing sector becomes more productive than the services sector.
In this setup, it turns out that the services share of value added coincides
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A rise in the relative productivity of manufacturing increases the relevance of
services value added only as long as the elasticity of substitution νC < 1, which
means that services consumption and manufacturing consumption are comple-
mentary.4 This positive derivative captures the Baumol (1969) cost disease chan-
nel, according to which the relative productivity affects the sectoral allocation
of consumption by changing the relative price across sectors. Since the house-
hold considers the consumption of manufacturing and services as complementary
goods, the rise in the productivity of the manufacturing sectors makes it optimal
to shift the employment towards services. In this way, the reallocation of em-
ployment boosts the final output of services, which can keep up with the rising
production of the highly productive manufacturing sector.
Second, I characterize the variation in the services share of intermediate in-
puts. In this case, I assume that the production of the final good only requires
intermediate inputs, αS = αM = 0. Then, the services share of intermediate in-
4With a unitary elasticity of substitution, such that the CES aggregator becomes a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion, the services share of employment is constant over time, independently of the variation in sectoral
productivities Ngai and Pissarides (2007). In the analysis, we follow Herrendorf et al. (2013), and set the
elasticity of substitution of consumption across sectors to be below one. The literature on multi-sector mod-
els that look at business cycle frequency tends to assume an elasticity of substitution of consumption across
sectors above one (Bouakez et al., 2018; Pasten et al., 2020). However, this strand of papers look at the short-
term elasticity of substitution, whereas here the focus is on the long-run complementarities between services
and manufacturing. Moreover, Hobijn and Nechio (2019) show how the value of the elasticity depends on
the level of disaggregation across sectors: the elasticity is above one only for very fine levels of disaggregation
that dig deeper than 2-digit NAICS industries (i.e., the elasticity is above one when considering at least 20
industries). The parameter νC should not be confused with the elasticity of substitution across varieties used
typically by New Keynesian models, or models featuring monopolistic competition (Christiano et al., 2005).
In this strand of the literature, the elasticity governs the substitution of varieties within a sector, whereas I
focus on the elasticity of substitution across sectors.
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In this case, the derivatives of the services share of intermediate inputs used in
either sector with respect to an increase in the relative productivity of manufac-














































Both derivatives are positive as long as the elasticities of substitution of inputs
is below one, that is, νS < 1 and νM < 1, which imply that manufacturing
and services intermediates are relatively poor substitutes. Also this mechanism
build on the Baumol disease channel, but this time the variation in relative
productivities affects the sectoral composition of the Input-Output matrix, via a
process that Galesi and Rachedi (2019) refer to as services deepening.
Overall, in the model the increase in the relative productivity of manufactur-
ing leads to a rise in both the services share of value added (employment) and
the services share of intermediate inputs, thereby amplifying the increase in the
services share of gross output. For this reason, in the quantitative analysis we
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mainly focus on the variation in the sectoral composition of gross output, and we
also perform a counterfactual exercise which abstracts from the services deepen-




To calibrate the model, I set one period of the model to be one year. Then,
I feed the model with the path of sectoral productivities observed in the data
to derive the implications of the model on the services share of gross output.
Importantly, since the model does not feature any inter-temporal decisions, I
solve this exercise as a sequence of steady-states. For this very same reason, the
calibration abstracts from setting a value for the time discount parameter β.5
The previous section has shown that the rise in the relative productivity of
manufacturing increases the services share of either employment or intermediate
inputs as long as the elasticity of substitution across sectors is below one. I
calibrate the three key elasticities of the model, the one governing the substitution
across sectoral consumption goods νC , and those capturing the substitution across
sectoral intermediate inputs νS and νM , to be very close to 0, that is, νC = νS =
νM = 0.01. This choice is consistent with the empirical evidence of Herrendorf
et al. (2013), that points out that the aggregator of consumption across services
and manufacturing could well be a Leontieff function, with an elasticity of 0.
Given the elasticities, I set the weight of services in aggregate consumption,
intermediate inputs used by the services sector, and intermediate inputs used by
5This is also the reason why neither the assumption on the risk-neutrality of the household nor the fact
that labor supply is inelastic alter the results of the analysis.
22
the manufacturing sector such as the model is consistent with these shares as ob-
served in the data in 1980. Finally, I calibrate the share of labor in gross output
in either sector by matching the average share of labor in gross output between
1980 and 2015, which yields the values of αS = 0.5217 and αM = 0.2184.
6 These
values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in
labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameter
Parameter Description Target/Source
As,t Productivity of Services Data on 1980-2015
As,t Productivity of Manufacturing Data on 1980-2015
ωC = 0.8588 Weight of Services in Aggregate Consumption Services Share of Gross Output
as of 1980
νC = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of Herrendorf et al. (2013)
Consumption Across Sectors
αS = 0.5217 Share of Labor in Services Gross Output Data
αM = 0.2184 Share of Labor in Manufacturing Gross Output Data
ωS = 0.6909 Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs Services Share of Services
Used by the Services Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νS = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νS = νC
Services Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
ωM = 0.2365 Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs Services Share of Manufacturing
Used by the Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νM = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νM = νC
Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
6I derive the labor share of gross output in the data as the ratio of the sectoral compensation of employees
over the sum of the sectoral compensation of employees and the sectoral expenditure in intermediate inputs.
In this way, the derivation of the labor share abstracts from the compensation of capital, consistently with
the fact that in the model there is no capital.
23
mainly focus on the variation in the sectoral composition of gross output, and we
also perform a counterfactual exercise which abstracts from the services deepen-
ing to measure the relative contribution of the rise in services in value added and
intermediate inputs.
4 Quantitative Res lts
4.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, I set one period of the model to be one year. Then,
I feed the model with the path of sectoral productivities observed in the data
to derive the implications of the model on the services share of gross output.
Importantly, since the model does not feature any inter-temporal decisions, I
solve this exercise as a sequence of steady-states. For this very same reason, the
calibration abstracts from setting a value for the time discount parameter β.5
The previous section has shown that the rise in the relative productivity of
manufacturing increases the services share of either employment or intermediate
inputs as long as the elasticity of substitution across sectors is below one. I
calibrate the three key elasticities of the model, the one governing the substitution
across sectoral consumption goods νC , and those capturing the substitution across
sectoral intermediate inputs νS and νM , to be very close to 0, that is, νC = νS =
νM = 0.01. This choice is consistent with the empirical evidence of Herrendorf
et al. (2013), that points out that the aggregator of consumption across services
and manufacturing could well be a Leontieff function, with an elasticity of 0.
Given the elasticities, I set the weight of services in aggregate consumption,
intermediate inputs used by the services sector, and intermediate inputs used by
5This is also the reaso why neither the assumption on the ri k-neu rali y of the household n r the fact
that labor supply is inelastic alter the results of the analysis.
22
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2003
the manufacturing sector such as the model is consistent with these shares as ob-
served in the data in 1980. Finally, I calibrate the share of labor in gross output
in either sector by matching the average share of labor in gross output between
1980 and 2015, which yields the values of αS = 0.5217 and αM = 0.2184.
6 These
values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in
labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameter
Parameter Description Target/Source
As,t Productivity of Services Data on 1980-2015
As,t Productivity of Manufacturing Data on 1980-2015
ωC = 0.8588 Weight of Services in Aggregate Consumption Services Share of Gross Output
as of 1980
νC = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of Herrendorf et al. (2013)
Consumption Across Sectors
αS = 0.5217 Share of Labor in Services Gross Output Data
αM = 0.2184 Share of Labor in Manufacturing Gross Output Data
ωS = 0.6909 Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs Services Share of Services
Used by the Services Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νS = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νS = νC
Services Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
ωM = 0.2365 Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs Services Share of Manufacturing
Used by the Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νM = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νM = νC
Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
6I derive the labor share of gross output in the data as the ratio of the sectoral compensation of employees
over the sum of the sectoral compensation of employees and the sectoral expenditure in intermediate inputs.
In this way, the derivation of the labor share abstracts from the compensation of capital, consistently with
the fact that in the model there is no capital.
23
the manufacturing sector such as the model is consistent with these shares as ob-
served in the data in 1980. Finally, I calibrate the share of labor in gross output
in either sector by matching the average share of labor in gross output between
1980 and 2015, which yields the values of αS = 0.5217 and αM = 0.2184.
6 These
values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in
labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameter
Parameter Description Target/Source
As,t Productivity of Services Data on 1980-2015
As,t Productivity of Manufacturing Data on 1980-2015
ωC = 0.8588 Weight of Services in Aggregate Consumption Services Share of Gross Output
as of 1980
νC = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of Herrendorf et al. (2013)
Consumption Across Sectors
αS = 0.5217 Share of Labor in Services Gross Output Data
αM = 0.2184 Share of Labor in Manufacturing Gross Output Data
ωS = 0.6909 Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs Services Share of Services
Used by the Services Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νS = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νS = νC
Services Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
ωM = 0.2365 Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs Services Share of Manufacturing
Used by the Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νM = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νM = νC
Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
6I derive the labor share of gross output in the data as the ratio of the sectoral compensation of employees
over the sum of the sectoral compensation of employees and the sectoral expenditure in intermediate inputs.
In this way, the derivation of the labor share abstracts from the compensation of capital, consistently with
the fact that in the model there is no capital.
23
the manufacturing sector such as the model is consistent with these shares as ob-
served in the data in 1980. Finally, I calibrate the share of labor in gross output
in either sector by matching the average share of labor in gross output between
1980 and 2015, which yields the values of αS = 0.5217 and αM = 0.2184.
6 These
values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in
labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameter
Parameter Description Target/Source
As,t Productivity of Services Data on 1980-2015
As,t Productivity of Manufacturing Data on 1980-2015
ωC = 0.8588 Weight of Services in Aggregate Consumption Services Share of Gross Output
as of 1980
νC = 0.01 Ela ticity f Substitution of Herrendorf et al. (2013)
Consumption Across Sectors
αS = 0.5217 Share of Labor in Services Gross Output Data
αM = 0.2184 Share of Labor in Manufacturing Gross Output Data
ωS = 0.6909 Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs Services Share of Services
Used by the Services Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νS = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νS = νC
Services Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
ωM = 0.2365 Weight of Services in I termediate Inputs Services Share of Manufacturing
Used by the Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs as of 1980
νM = 0.01 Elasticity of Substitution of νM = νC
Manufacturing Intermediate Inputs Across Sectors
6I d rive the labor share of gross output in the data as the ratio of the sectoral compensation of employees
over the sum of the sect ral compensation of employee and the sectoral expenditure in intermediate inpu s.
In this way, the d rivation of the labor share abstracts from the compensation of capital, consistently with
the fact that in the model there is no capital.
23
Then, I consider also a counterfactual version of the model which abstracts
from the process of services deepening, that is, I consider an economy in which
the services share of value added changes endogenously over time but there is no
variation in the sectoral composition of the Input-Output matrix. This economy
sets the elasticities of substitution of intermediate inputs to νS = νM = 1, such
as the aggregator becomes a Cobb-Douglas function, and I calibrate the weight
of services in the aggregators such as the model is consistent with the services
share of intermediate inputs as of 1980. In this way, the comparison of the base-
line model with this counterfactual economy isolates the contribution of services
deepening in accounting for the rise in the services share of gross output.
4.2 The Services Gross Share
Once I feed into the model the paths of productivity of the services and man-
ufacturing sector observed in the data between 1980 and 2015, the model can
successfully imply a path for the services share of gross output which tracks re-
markably well the one observed in the data. Figure 5 reports the services share
of gross output of Spanish economy between 1980 and 2015, together with the
services share of gross output implied by both the baseline model and the model
without services deepening. The baseline model can account really well for the
size of the services sector in the last year of the sample, although it generates a
bit of overshooting especially throughout the 1990 decade. However, the average
annual difference between the services share of gross output implied by the model
and that of the data is well below 1%.
To generate this successful fit the necessary feature is a very low elasticity
of substitution of consumption and intermediate inputs across sectors, which I
set to νC = νS = νM = 0.01, at the lower end of the estimates of Herren-
dorf et al. (2013). If I set the elasticity to substitution to the higher value of
24
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2003
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share of intermediate inputs as of 1980. In this way, the comparison of the base-
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νC = νS = νM = 0.4, in line with the calibration choice in Duarte and Restuccia
(2010), then the gross output share implied by the model as of 2015 is 61%,
which means that this version of the model accounts for 62% of the the rise of
the services share in gross output observed in the data.
Figure 5: The Services Share of Gross Output in the Model and the Data
Note: This figure shows services share of gross output of the Spanish economy
observed in the data between 1980 and 2015 (i.e., “Data”), with that one implied
by the baseline model (i.e., “Model”), and the implications of the counterfactual
version of the model with no variation in the sectoral composition of intermediate
inputs (i.e., “No Services Deepening“).
What is the role for the changes in the sectoral composition of the Input-
Output matrix to generate the fit of the model on the variation in the services
share of gross output? The role of services deepening can be measured by com-
paring the implications of the baseline model with that of the model with no
change in the services share of intermediate inputs. Figure 5 shows that the
model with no services deepening starts underestimating the change in the ser-
vices share of gross output from the early 1990s on, and ends up implying a share
of 60% as of 2015. This result highlights that services deepening accounts for
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which means that this version of the model accounts for 62% of the the rise of
the services share in gross output observed in the data.
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Note: This figure shows services share of gross output of the Spanish economy
observed in the data between 1980 and 2015 (i.e., “Data”), with that one implied
by the baseline model (i.e., “Model”), and the implications of the counterfactual
version of the model with no variation in the sectoral composition of intermediate
inputs (i.e., “No Services Deepening“).
What is the role for the changes in the sectoral composition of the Input-
Output matrix to generate the fit of the model on the variation in the services
share of gross output? The role of services deepening can be measured by com-
paring the implications of the baseline model with that of the model with no
change in the services share of intermediate inputs. Figure 5 shows that the
model with no services deepening starts underestimating the change in the ser-
vices share of gross output from the early 1990s on, and ends up implying a share
of 60% as of 2015. This result highlights that services deepening accounts for
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38% of the performance of the model in explaining the variation in the services
share of gross utput between 1980 and 2015, and confirms t findings of Galesi
and Rachedi (2019) n the crucial role of the changes in the sectoral variation of
the Input-Output matrix to understand the overall increase in the services share
of the economy.
Hence, the model successfully replicates the variation in the services share of
gross output of the Spanish economy between 1980 and 2015, and more than a
third of this performance is due to the variation in the sectoral composition of
intermediate inputs.
5 The Spanish Economy from 2015 to 2050
The results of the previous section on the fact that the model-implied path for the
services share of gross output between 1980 and 2015 tracks remarkably well the
dynamics of the share observed in the data guarantees that the model is an ideal
laboratory to look at the causes and implications of structural transformation
for the Spanish economy. Hence, we use the model to look at the implications
of GDP growth going forward, from 2015 to 2050, and compare them with the
observed GDP growth between 1980 and 2015. Hernandez de Cos et al. (2011),
Cuadrado and Moral-Benito (2016), Fu and Moral-Benito (2018) have also de-
rived implications on the future path of aggregate productivity and GDP growth
of the Spanish economy. However, their approach used reduced-form techniques.
Instead, the predictions of this paper are based on a structural approach, in which
the model derives endogenously the future path of aggregate productivity and
GDP given exogenous measures of sectoral TFP.
To perform this exercise, I need to take a stand on the dynamics of sectoral
productivities between 2015 and 2050, as the sectoral composition of the economy
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38% of the performance of the model in explaining the variation in the services
share of gross output between 1980 and 2015, and confirms the findings of Galesi
and Rachedi (2019) on the crucial role of the changes in the sectoral variation of
the Input-Output matrix to understand the overall increase in the services share
of the economy.
Hence, the model successfully replicates the variation in the services share of
gross output of the Spanish economy between 1980 and 2015, and more than a
third of this performance is due to the variation in the sectoral composition of
intermediate inputs.
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GDP given exogenous measures of sectoral TFP.
To perform this exercise, I need to take a stand on the dynamics of sectoral
productivities between 2015 and 2050, as the sectoral composition of the economy
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– and the implied paths for aggregate productivity and GDP – depend crucially
on this choice. Hence, I take a very transparent approach: I assume that from
2015 to 2050 the paths of sectoral productivities equal exactly the trends observed
in the data between 1980 and 2015. In this way, the comparison of the variation in
GDP growth between the two periods of interest does not hinge on any underlying
variation in sectoral productivities, but only depends on the endogenous changes
in the sectoral composition of the economy. As the Spanish economy would
switch more and more towards the services sector with a relatively lower level of
productivity, then the level of aggregate productivity would decrease, dampening
the implied GDP growth of the economy.
Table 3 reports the results of the exercise. First, it is worth noticing that the
model implies that in 2050 the services share of gross output will be 80%, well
above the 67.6% observed in the data as of 2015. Hence, the Spanish economy
will become even more intense in the services sector, and the low productivity
of services would dampen the overall level of aggregate productivity. Indeed, the
model implies that from 2015 to 2050 the average annual growth of Spanish GDP
would be 0.6 percentage point lower than what it has been between 1980 and
2015. This result implies that if the GDP growth observed in the data between
1980 and 2015 has been 2.3%, going forward over the next three decades the
growth rate would slow down to 1.9%.
What would be the growth rate of GDP if there were no changes in the Input-
Output matrix from 2015 to 2050? In this case, the rise of the services share of
gross output would be around 75%, much lower than in the baseline case. As a
result, the dampening of the annual GDP growth would also be less relevant: the
model without services deepening implies that annual GDP growth would slow
down from an average value of 2.3% between 1980 and 2015, to 2.1% between
2015 and 2050.
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– and the implied paths for aggregate productivity and GDP – depend crucially
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switch more and more towards the services sector with a relatively lower level of
productivity, then the level of aggregate productivity would decrease, dampening
the implied GDP growth of the economy.
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model implies that in 2050 the services share of gross output will be 80%, well
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2015. This result implies that if the GDP growth observed in the data between
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growth rate would slow down to 1.9%.
What would be the growth rate of GDP if there were no changes in the Input-
Output matrix from 2015 to 2050? In this case, the rise of the services share of
gross output would be around 75%, much lower than in the baseline case. As a
result, the dampening of the annual GDP growth would also be less relevant: the
model without services deepening implies that annual GDP growth would slow
down from an average value of 2.3% between 1980 and 2015, to 2.1% between
2015 and 2050.
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Table 3: The Average Annual Growth Rate of Spanish GDP
1980-2015 2015-2050
Data 2.3% -
Baseline Model 2.3% 1.7%
Model Without 2.3% 1.9%
Services Deepening
Model with EU 2.5% 2.1%
Sectoral Productivities
Note: This table reports the average growth rate of Spanish
GDP between 1980-2015 and 2015-2050 as observed in the
data vis-a´-vis the prediction of the baseline model, a ver-
sion without services deepening in which the sectoral com-
position of the Input-Output matrix is constant over time,
and a version of the model which uses the average trends
in sectoral productivities observed in other large European
countries between 1980-2015.
Finally, I look at the predictions of the model from 2015 to 2050 by assuming
that the sectoral productivities will follow the trends observed between 1980 and
2015 in the Euro area countries. In particular, I consider the trend of services
and manufacturing industries averaging the values observed in Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.7 In this case, the growth
rate of manufacturing productivity and the growth rate of services productivity
is 0.8% and 0.2%, above the value observed respectively in the Spanish economy:
0.6% and -0.3%. If I feed these trends in the model, then the relatively higher
level of productivities imply a milder drop in GDP growth: the average annual
GDP growth from 2015 to 2050 will be 2.1%, just 0.2 percentage points the
average observed in the previous three decades.
7These countries are the only Euro-area economies with information on services and manufacturing pro-
ductivity dating back to the 1980 in the World KLEMS database.
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A natural question that emerges is whether the negative effects on aggre-
gate productivity due to the rise of services are larger in Spain vis-a´-vis other
economies. To answer this question, I can compare the change in aggregate
productivity due to the reallocation of employment (or economic activity more
broadly) across sectors such as the share of manufacturing drops by 1% and the
share of services rises by 1%. In this case, aggregate productivity growth would
drop by -0.9%, which is the difference in the Spanish economy between the aver-
age productivity growth of manufacturing of 0.6% and the average productivity
growth of services of -0.3%. A similar reallocation of resources in Euro area
countries would imply a milder drop of aggregate productivity of 0.6%, which is
the difference between the average productivity growth of manufacturing of 0.8%
and the average productivity growth of services of 0.2% observed in Euro area
countries.
Overall, this exercise makes three main points: (i) the rise in the services share
of the Spanish economy together with the fact that services are characterized
by a relatively lower sectoral productivity will imply that going forward the
aggregate productivity and GDP growth of Spain will slow down, (ii) if the paths
of sectoral productivities of the Spanish economy manage to improve over time
o the similar levels observed in other Euro are countries, then the variation in
the sectoral composition of the economy towards the services sector would have a
limited effect of the future path of GDP growth, and (iii) since the difference in
productivity growth between manufacturing and services is larger in Spain than
in other economies, then the Spanish economy is relatively more exposed to the
dampening of GDP growth due to the rise of services.
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6 Conclusions
This paper shows that the rise of the services sector in the Spanish economy may
dampen GDP growth by 0.6 percentage points in the future, from an average
annual growth rate of 2.3% between 1980 and 2015 to a rate of 1.7% between
2015 and 2050. This result is due to the fact that the services sector is much
less productive than manufacturing, and therefore the shifts of economy activ-
ity towards services would dampen aggregate productivity and therefore GDP
growth. However, if sectoral productivities were to equal the levels observed in
the Euro Area between 1980 and 2015, the average growth rate of Spanish GDP
between 2015 and 2050 would be 2.1%. Most of the gap of the productivity of
the Spanish services sector with respect to other European advanced economies
is concentrated in industries such as the professional services and accommodation
and food services.
An important caveat of this analysis is that the implications of the model on
the growth rate of GDP from 2015 on are derived under the assumption that the
path of sectoral productivity going forward equals the one observed in the data
from 1980 to 2015. However, the future productivity of the Spanish economy may
differ from the historical one because of a change in either the overall level of
aggregate TFP (i.e., the part of productivity that is common across sectors), or
the level of sectoral TFPs (i.e., the part of productivity which is idiosyncratic to
each industry). In future research, I will dig deeper these dynamics to disentangle
the contribution of the trends in aggregate productivity vis-a´-vis sector-specific
productivity to the overall variation in the TFP of the Spanish economy.
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ity towards services would dampen aggregate productivity and therefore GDP
growth. However, if sectoral productivities were to equal the levels observed in
the Euro Area between 1980 and 2015, the average growth rate of Spanish GDP
between 2015 and 2050 would be 2.1%. Most of the gap of the productivity of
the Spanish services sector with respect to other European advanced economies
is concentrated in industries such as the professional services and accommodation
and food services.
An important caveat of this analysis is that the implications of the model on
the growth rate of GDP from 2015 on are derived under the assumption that the
path of sectoral productivity going forward equals the one observed in the data
from 1980 to 2015. However, the future productivity of the Spanish economy may
differ from the historical one because of a change in either the overall level of
aggregate TFP (i.e., the part of productivity that is common across sectors), or
the level of sectoral TFPs (i.e., the part of productivity which is idiosyncratic to
each industry). In future research, I will dig deeper these dynamics to disentangle
the contribution of the trends in aggregate productivity vis-a´-vis sector-specific
productivity to the overall variation in the TFP of the Spanish economy.
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